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Introduction
Since its origins in 1947, the multilateral trading system has seen quotas 
imposed on products ranging from cheese and butter to high deﬁ  nition tele-
visions, steel, and motor vehicles. Quantitative restrictions on international 
trade ﬂ  ows, and, more broadly speaking, the entire class of nontariﬀ barriers 
(NTBs), have proven an important feature of the policy landscape. For this 
reason, estimates of the trade cost-  equivalents of NTBs are critical inputs 
to the assessment of the welfare impact of trade policy, as well as to actual 
trade negotiations. They also inﬂ  uence the trade patterns at the core of the 
raft of recent econometric work based on the gravity model (Anderson and 
van Wincoop 2003 2004).
The launching of the World Trade Organization (WTO) brought with it 
the dismantling of the single biggest system of quota restrictions to emerge 
as part of the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT)- based trad-
ing system—an elaborate system of bilateral quotas on textiles and cloth-
ing trade. The process of dismantling these quotas under the Agreement 
on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) was staged over a ten-  year period ending 
in 2005. In their paper, Brambilla, Klandelwal, and Schott examine the 
impact of the Multi-  Fiber Arrangement (MFA) and ATC on China. They 
provide a valuable and detailed examination of the utilization of quotas, 
the impact of quotas, and their expansion on exports during the MFA and 
ATC, and their role in the surge of exports from China after quotas ended. 
Their ﬁ  ndings ﬁ  t with other recent estimates (Francois and Woerz 2009; 
Martin 2004; Andriamananjara, Dean, and Spinanger 2004). While by con-
struction the quotas were increased over time, the technical liberali  zation 
of a quota does not guarantee de facto relaxation of implicit trade barri-
ers when the external environment is also changing. In the case of China, 
quotas on Chinese exports to both the United States and European Union 
(EU) clearly grew at a rate unable to keep up with the rapid expansion of 
potential trade due to a mix of both underlying supply and demand growth. 
As a result, China was more constrained than other countries under the 
ATC, and, consequently, there was a surge in China’s market share when 
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In my comments, I will focus on two issues. One is the broader context 
of the ATC phaseout, in terms of its origins and related concerns about 
quota liberalization on smaller, less-  competitive suppliers. The second is 
the pattern of restrictions on China relative to other major suppliers under 
the ATC regime.
The ATC and MFA in Context
Like agriculture, the textile and clothing sectors emerged in the early 
years of the GATT system as politically sensitive sectors. As such, they 
were treated as special cases within the world trading system, with their 
own regulatory framework. While technically in violation of the GATT, 
the quotas were ﬁ  rst institutionalized in the beginning of the 1960s with the 
Short-  Term Arrangement (STA) for international trade in cotton textiles. 
The STA aimed at an orderly opening of restricted markets to avoid (for 
importing countries) “detrimental market disruptions.” The deﬁ  nition of 
“market disruption” adopted by the Contracting Parties in 1960 entailed the 
possibility of singling out imports of particular products from particular 
countries as the disrupting source. This opened the door for a series of 
bilaterally negotiated quota restrictions that became the rule in the following 
Long-  Term Arrangement (LTA) in 1962. Details on the subsequent evolu-
tion of acronyms are provided in table 9C.1.
By the start of the 1970s, it had become apparent that the multiplicity 
of makeshift arrangements protecting the textile and clothing industries 
had to be replaced. Resulting negotiations led to the MFA, which went into 
eﬀect in 1974. Over time, its product coverage was extended from cotton 
to noncotton textiles and clothing. The ﬁ  nal MFA (known as MFA IV) 
was extended several times, leading in the end to the ATC in 1995. Like 
the preceding arrangements, the MFA provided rules for the imposition of 
quotas, either through bilateral agreements or unilateral actions, whenever 
actual or perceived surges of imports caused market disruption. (Baugh-
man et al. 1997; Krishna and Tan 1997). This included the threat of a surge. 
In the years leading up to the Uruguay Round Agreements, six developed 
participants actively applied quotas under the MFA—the EU, the United 
States, Canada, Norway, Finland, and Austria. These were applied almost 
exclusively on imports from developing countries. Sweden liberalized its 
textile and clothing regime in 1991 and actually managed to withdraw from 
the MFA. Sadly, Sweden was forced to rejoin this regime when it joined the 
EU. Two other developed- country participants, Japan and Switzerland, did 
not impose MFA quotas, but instead restricted themselves to “signaling” a 
readiness to apply quotas by the act of being signatories to the MFA agree-
ment, combined with (active) import surveillance. As shown by Winters 
(1994), import surveillance can, at least in concentrated industries, induce a 
fall in import levels as producers are trying to forestall explicit quotas. The 
restrictiveness of the applied MFA quotas, and subsequent ATC quotas, var-Table 9C.1  A parade of acronyms: the evolution of quotas
Year   Overview of events
1955–57 U.S.–Japan dispute leads to a 5-  year agreement limiting textile exports
1958 United Kingdom imposes “voluntary” limitation on cotton textile and clothing 
products with Hong Kong by threatening to otherwise impose quotas at 
levels lower than prevailing volumes.
1959 United Kingdom signs restraint agreements with India and Pakistan.
1960 General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade Contracting Parties recognize the 
problem of “market disruption” to serve as an “excuse” for establishing 
future nontariﬀ barriers.
1961 STA: The Short-  Term Arrangement (STA) is agreed.
1962 LTA1: The Long-  Term Arrangement (LTA) is agreed, to commence October 1, 
1962, and last for ﬁ  ve years.
1963–65 United States tries and fails to establish agreement on trade in wool products
1966 The United Kingdom implements a global quota scheme in violation of the 
LTA. The LTA provides only for product-  speciﬁ  c restraints.
1967 LTA2: Agreement is reached to extend the LTA for three years.
1969–71 United States negotiates voluntary export restraints with Asian suppliers on 
wool and man-  made ﬁ  bers.
1970 LTA3: Agreement is reached to extend the LTA for three years. It was later 
extended three months more, to ﬁ  ll the gap until the Multi-  Fiber 
Arrangement (MFA) came into eﬀect.
1973 MFA I: The MFA is agreed, to commence January 1, 1974, and to last for four 
years.
1977 The European Economic Community and the United States negotiates bilateral 
agreements with developing countries prior to agreeing to extension of the 
MFA.
1977 MFA II: The MFA is extended for four years.
1981 MFA III: The MFA is renewed for ﬁ  ve years. The United States, under pressure 
from increased imports resulting from dollar appreciation, negotiates tough 
quotas.
1986 MFA IV: The MFA is extended for 5 years, to conclude with the expected end 
of the Uruguay Round (UR).
1991 MFA IV: The MFA is extended pending outcome of the UR negotiations.
1993 The UR draft ﬁ  nal act provides for a 10-  year phase-  out of all MFA and other 
quotas on textiles in the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC). MFA 
extends until UR comes into force. ATC allows credit for liberalization in 
products that are not actually restricted.
1995 ATC1: 1st ATC tranche liberalized 16% of 1990 imports.
1998 ATC2: 2nd ATC tranche liberalized 17% of 1990 imports.
2001 ATC3: 3rd ATC tranche liberalized 18% of 1990 imports.
2005 ATC4: 4th ATC tranche liberalized 49% of 1990 imports.
Déjà vu all over again: United States and European Union reimpose quotas on 
China.
Source: Based on an update of Francois, Glismann, and Spinanger (2000), from Francois and 
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ied from product to product and from supplier to supplier. Norway dropped 
the use of binding quotas with the shift from MFA to ATC.
The Ministerial Declaration at Punta Del Este in 1986 that launched the 
Uruguay Round stated that the “Negotiations in the area of textiles and 
clothing shall aim to formulate modalities that would permit the eventual 
integration of this sector into GATT on the basis of strengthened GATT 
rules and disciplines.” In plain English, this was a promise to developing 
countries that MFA quotas were ﬁ  nally going to be eliminated. Indeed, this 
promise was critical to convincing developing countries to sign on at the 
creation of the then new WTO. The Uruguay Round of GATT negotia-
tions launched at Punta Del Este led to the ATC in 1995. The ATC was the 
institutional embodiment of the promise to end quotas in an orderly process. 
Indeed, it was ﬂ  agged as a major showpiece in the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments and an important source of trade-  based income gains linked to the 
introduction of the WTO (Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr 1995; Francois, 
McDonald, and Nordström 1995; Hertel et al. 1995). By design, the agree-
ment mapped a gradual phaseout of the quota restrictions carried over from 
the MFA regime on a ten-  year timetable leading to full elimination.
Though the ATC was a response to developing- country demands, a num-
ber of developing countries expressed concern from the outset, and some 
even mounted a rearguard action in the end of the ATC phaseout to try and 
block ﬁ  nal quota elimination. In combination with regional agreements, the 
quotas had led to a distorted pattern of exports, with high import shares for 
Eastern European and Mediterranean suppliers in the EU market and like-
wise for Mexico in the U.S. market. For instance, Spinanger (1999) reports 
evidence that the EU quotas in textile and clothing prevented diversiﬁ  cation 
of the market across exporting countries based on relative costs. In the case 
of the EU, these distortions were also intentionally used for a discrimina-
tory trade policy with the aim to spur development in certain countries at 
the expense of other developing countries. With China more restricted than 
other suppliers (a fact conﬁ  rmed by the Brambilla, Khandelwal, and Schott 
estimates), there was genuine concern that smaller, less-  competitive suppli-
ers would be hurt in the competitive shuﬄe following liberalization.
Related to concerns about smaller exporters, there was also concern that 
the MFA and ATC had induced too much specialization in unconstrained 
exporters (for example, Bangladesh). Through the quota system, some 
small, unconstrained exporters were largely protected from the competi-
tion of other, bigger suppliers for a long time. Thus, the quota system might 
have induced strong and persistent specialization in textiles and clothing in 
these countries, while in the absence of the quotas the need to diversify into 
other industries may have been stronger. The worry was that removal of 
the quotas against all suppliers would suddenly make such a failure all too 
obvious (Spinanger 1999).
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we did indeed see a surge in exports from China after the ATC quotas were 
eliminated. From their detailed analysis, they also report that unit values 
fell in products where quotas were lifted. China moved to lower prices and 
higher volumes in liberalized products (consistent with loss of quota rents 
in export pricing). This is only part of the story, however. Because China’s 
quota growth rates did not keep up with growth in supply conditions in 
China (where growth was around ten percent a year), let alone the com-
bined impact of income growth (i.e., rising demand) in North America and 
Europe, the quotas on China were still largely binding when they expired. 
The outcome was political theater, new quotas on China, and revitalization 
of managed trade in the sector. I will focus on the pattern of protection 
against China in the next section.
The Impact of the Quotas
The impact of quantitative restrictions on trade is reﬂ  ected in per-  unit 
economic rent generated by a binding quota. This is because a binding quota 
eﬀectively limits the supply of the good in the importing market, resulting in 
a price markup and giving economic rents to those suppliers who have access 
to the market (i.e., those who are able to export inside the quota). Because 
the quotas on textiles and clothing were administered as “voluntary” export 
restraints by the suppliers, often with the quotas distributed by auction, 
these rents can alternatively be seen as an implicit tax on exports. For these 
reasons, the eﬀect of the quotas in the literature is generally expressed as 
an export tax equivalent (ETE). In their paper, Brambilla, Khandelwal, 
and Schott use ETEs to focus in detail on how quotas impacted China. I 
will focus here on how, at the same time, these quotas had a broadly more 
restrictive impact on China than on other suppliers, again in terms of ETEs. 
To do this, I will make some comparisons based on ETEs for a wider set of 
countries, though at a more aggregate level.
Table 9C.2 reports information on the top ﬁ  ve suppliers in textiles and 
clothing for the quota using importers: Canada, the United States, and the 
EU. Because China ranged among the top suppliers for all quota users in 
2001, the evolution of the Chinese ETEs as implied by the quotas can be read 
from table 9C.2. The tariﬀ and ETE estimates in table 9C.2 come from Fran-
cois and Woerz (2009). Other data come from Martin (2004) and the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators database. Canada was the quota user 
most compliant with the ATC among all three. The reduction in price wedges 
for China was especially impressive. During the life of the ATC, the ETE 
was reduced to zero from an estimated 30.4 percent of export price for cloth-
ing. Indeed, with most suppliers, liberalization was substantial in Canada, 
if not complete, even if some high barriers remained, mostly against minor 
suppliers (for instance, Jamaica, Qatar, and Morocco).
While there was a clear pattern toward liberalization for imports to the 
EU, the degree of liberalization was more limited than in the Canadian Table 9C.2  Top 5 import suppliers
ETEs as % of export 
price
    2001 import share   2001 tariﬀ   1996   2004
EU15: textiles
Turkey 14.0 0.0
China 9.1 8.2 18.6∗∗∗ 14.0∗∗∗
India 8.1 7.5 6.6∗∗∗ 2.0∗∗∗
United States 4.7 6.4
Pakistan 4.6 0.0 13.1∗∗∗ 3.2∗∗∗
All 100.0 1.8 1.8 0.7
EU15: clothing




India 5.8 8.5 19.3∗∗∗
All 100.0 3.2 13.1 3.6
United States: textiles
Mexico 12.7 0.1
European Union 10.9 8.5
China 10.2 7.4 6.5∗∗∗ 7.2∗∗∗
Canada 7.7 0.0
Pakistan 5.4 9.0 5.2∗∗∗
All 100.0 7.9 3.8 3.5
United States: clothing
China 13.3 9.8 43.3∗∗∗ 48.1∗∗∗
Mexico 12.1 0.1
Hong Kong 6.9 11.5
European Union 4.5 10.1
Indonesia 4.3 12.7
All 100.0 9.9 10.2 14.5
Canada: textiles
United States 54.2 0.0
European Union 8.7 9.4
China 7.4 13.5 5.9∗∗∗
Korea, Republic of 4.4 10.3
India 3.6 10.9 0.1
All 100.0 5.2 0.5 0.0
Canada: clothing
China 27.4 15.6 30.4∗∗∗
United States 12.0 0.0
European Union 8.0 16.3
India 7.8 17.7
Hong Kong 6.4 17.9
All   100.0   14.5   11.6   0.1
Source: Francois and Woerz (2009).
Note: ETEs  export tax equivalents
∗∗∗Estimated bilateral ETEs signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
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case. Although trade with China became more liberalized, the degree of 
protection remained high at the end of the ATC. Table 9C.2 shows the fall 
in protection against China. However, the tariﬀ equivalents at the end of 
the ATC remained substantial. The removal of the quota system by 2005 
thus implied a substantial surge in imports from China. Indeed, as Bram-
billa, Khandelwal, and Schott note, in 2004 and 2005, we saw a tremendous 
increases in China’s market share in the EU market, leading to a reimposi-
tion of quotas by the middle of 2005.
Most interesting is the experience with the United States. The ETEs for 
China actually went up. The observed backloading of trade liberalization 
vis-  à-  vis China should not be surprising and cannot be ascribed purely to 
noncompliance with the ATC. Nor is it the case that China was alone. Chi-
na’s experience was instead a consequence, in part, of the design of the sys-
tem. From table 9C.2, U.S. protection against restricted suppliers went up for 
ﬁ  fteen WTO exporters of textiles. Only four WTO suppliers—Cambodia, 
Macedonia, Brazil, and Pakistan—faced falling export tax equivalents dur-
ing the ATC in the U.S. market. For clothing, three suppliers—Uruguay, 
Cambodia, and India—saw a fall in their ETEs, while nine suppliers faced 
increasing price distortions—Turkey, Bulgaria, China, Poland, Hungary, 
Slovakia, Romania, and the Czech Republic.
In the case of China, the spike in U.S. quotas follows from the interac-
tion of several factors. The ﬁ  rst factor is the failure of quota growth to 
keep up with growth in potential trade. This is illustrated in table 9C.3, 
which highlights the strong expansion of the Chinese economy and, thus, 
the huge increase in export potential over the life of the ATC. This growth 
well surpassed quota growth rates. While the Chinese quotas on the U.S. 
market increased by 33 percent in textiles and 41 percent in clothing between 
1994 and 2004, Chinese gross domestic product (GDP) rose by 170 percent 
over the same period. With a cumulative growth of 61 percent, U.S. GDP 
growth—as a proxy for the growth of import demand—itself outstripped 
the rate of quota expansion. Another factor in spiking ETEs was the ability 
to “borrow forward” on quotas. This meant that, for example, in late 2000, 
importers could borrow against 2001 quota limits. Obviously, by late 2004, 
there were no more quotas to borrow against, contributing to the late surge 
in U.S. ETEs as the system, by construction, became increasingly restric-
tive.
Closing Comments
Careful empirical analysis of quota regimes, like those provided by Bram-
billa, Khandelwal, and Schott, oﬀer valuable insight regarding the political 
diﬃculties that followed the ATC’s end days. The ATC embodied commit-
ments to a ten-  year, staged reduction in quotas. The process was advertised 
as orderly, systematic, and transparent. Yet the end of the ATC brought with 
it sudden surges in imports from China, panicked trade ministers, rushed 394        Irene Brambilla, Amit K. Khandelwal, and Peter K. Schott
meetings, and the reimposition of quotas on China by late 2005 in both the 
United States and EU. This episode is fully consistent with recent estimates 
of the price impact of quotas. A key implication from the results of this 
research is that the problem of China’s textile and clothing sector integra-
tion was basically deferred rather than managed in stages. This was not 
solely a result of the ATC itself, but was certainly reinforced by insuﬃcient 
predeﬁ  ned quota expansion rates during a period of outstandingly strong 
expansion of China’s supply potential and demand growth in North Amer-
ica and Europe.
An important underlying question is the extent to which managed trade 
in textiles and clothing is really a thing of the past. There was a de facto 
peace clause during the MFA and ATC. Exporters agreed to managed 
trade, and importers agreed not to support antidumping and countervail-
ing duty investigations. Obviously, this cease ﬁ  re is over. We may yet see a 
return to managed trade. In addition, there are now countries outside the 
original MFA importer club—Korea, Brazil, South Africa, and Mexico, 
for example—who may themselves succumb to similar pressure to manage 
trade in these sector as they move up the value added ladder and their own 
producers fall under rising competitive pressure from importers. The MFA 
(and ATC) may be dead. However, we cannot assume the political economy 
fundamentals that drove the creation of the system in the ﬁ  rst place really 
have been put to rest.
Table 9C.3  Cumulative growth: 1994–2004 (%)
Quota growth
textiles clothing GDP growth
    U.S.   EU   U.S.   EU   Per capita   In total
Importer
United States 49 66
European Union 55 61
Exporter
Bangladesh 168 168 26 53
China 33 50 41 38 151 171
Hong Kong 37 16 17 22 1 16
India 141 50 116 79 57 84
Indonesia 134 83 133 117 19 35
Korea, Republic of 37 70 12 38 34 44
Pakistan 139 79 150 119 30 63
Sri Lanka 134 204 132 204 43 56
Philippines, The 134 112 119 112 1 21
Thailand   127   116   123   116   –10   –1
Sources: Martin (2004), Eurostat, IFS, and Francois and Woerz (2009).China’s Experience under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement    3 9 5
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